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This paper uses a comparative institutionalist approach combined with a power/interests 
perspective to examine the processes whereby diversity policy is „internationalized‟ by US 
multinational companies. It argues that the process of policy transfer to UK subsidiaries is 
complicated by incomplete and contested „institutionalization‟ of diversity within the US 
itself, and by differing conceptions of diversity between the US and the UK. The ability of 
actors within the UK subsidiaries to mobilize and deploy specific power resources allows 
them to resist the full implementation of corporate diversity policy, leading to a range of 
compromise accommodations. It is argued that the findings have more general implications 
for analyzing the transfer of HR practices between national business systems. 
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Institutional theory and cross-national transfer: the case 
of ‘workforce diversity’ policy in US multinationals 
Introduction 
 
One of the key issues in the theory and practice of international business is the transfer by 
multinational companies (MNCs) of policies and practices between the different national 
business systems in which they operate. International transfer is a process whose specific 
complexity lies in the need to transmit between two institutional „domains‟ that differ in 
important respects. Such differences go beyond those found within the same national 
business „space‟, and raise questions about how practices originating in one national 
institutional sphere are incorporated into a significantly different one.  
The paper explores this issue through an empirical study of one area of global 
corporate activity: international workforce „diversity‟ policies within American MNCs. The 
idea of diversity is understood in a wide variety of ways, but in the American context the 
predominant emphasis has been on the diverse gender and ethnic composition of the 
workforce. Diversity appears to have been poorly studied so far in an international context. It 
is of particular interest here because it has very clear roots in a domestic American policy 
agenda, and its applicability in different business contexts outside the USA is at first sight 
problematic. It therefore has the potential to throw particular light on the relationship between 
features of a parent business system and the internationalization of policy. The paper 
considers the transfer of policies to UK subsidiaries of US companies. The theoretical 
contribution of the paper lies in its examination the key business issue of cross-national 
transfer policy in the light of comparative institutional theory.  
The first section examines the literature on cross-national transfer in the context of 
debates on the nature of institutions, and particularly Christine Oliver‟s (1991) contribution 
on organizations‟ strategic responses to institutional pressures. The following section 
considers the substantive area of diversity as it has emerged in US corporations, arguing that 
it reflects a specifically American policy agenda. Moreover, the diversity agenda is subject to 
considerable strains that render it a „contested institutional terrain‟. It is suggested that this 
institutional context strongly colours the characteristics of international diversity policy 
within MNCs. Following a section describing research methods, the fourth section presents 
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data on international diversity policy from in-depth case studies in US MNCs. The discussion 
draws out the implications of the findings, in particular for models of international policy 
transfer within MNCs. 
 
Multinationals and the cross-national transfer of policy 
In the business literature a variety of factors have been put forward to explain patterns of 
cross-national transfer within MNCs. These may be categorized as factors to do with the 
structure and strategy of multinationals; the properties of particular practices and policies; 
and the nature of the national systems between which policies are being transferred. More 
attention will be devoted to the third of these as it is critical for an understanding of cross-
national transfer, and since it interacts with both structural factors and with the transferability 
characteristics of practices.   
In terms of structural factors, policy transfer is likely to be affected by the role that a 
subsidiary plays within the overall MNC (e.g. Ghoshal and Nohria, 1993); the extent of 
interdependencies between units (e.g. Taylor et al., 1996); and the nature of intra-corporate 
and external networks in which subsidiaries are embedded (e.g. Zanfei, 2002). For example, a 
subsidiary that is highly integrated into the wider MNC and whose function is to execute 
strategies devised at HQ is more likely to be the recipient of transferred knowledge and 
practice (Gupta and Govindarajan, 1991). This approach has been applied to the transfer of 
HR policy specifically (e.g. Edwards and Ferner, 2004; Florkowski, 1996; Schuler et al., 
1993; Taylor et al., 1996).  
Second, at the level of specific practices, researchers (e.g. Szulanski 1996; Lam 1997) 
have analysed the factors encouraging or reducing transferability. In general, the cross-
national „stickiness‟ of a practice depends on such factors as the degree to which the relevant 
knowledge is tacit or „codified‟; and the extent to which there is „causal ambiguity‟, where 
the precise reasons for success or failure in reproducing a practice in a new context are 
unclear (Szulanski 1996: 31). More generally, scholars adopting the „resource-based‟ view of 
the firm, have argued that transfer of a policy is more likely to occur where policies are a 
source of international competitive advantage for the MNC (e.g. Taylor et al., 1996). 
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International transfer and national institutions 
The third set of factors in international transfer concerns the nature of differences in business 
organization and institutions between the MNC‟s country of origin and the subsidiary‟s 
country of operation. There have been various approaches to conceptualizing the nature of 
such cross-national differences. For two decades the business literature was dominated by 
„culturalist‟ perspectives, stemming from Hofstede (1980) and his followers. These 
approaches, focusing on national variations in cultural values, have often been highly 
reductionist, assessing differences between countries in terms of simplistic cultural indices 
that fail to take into account crucial differences in business institutions and organization in 
different national business systems. The culturalist approach is also essentially ahistorical, 
seeing values as constant characteristics of national mindsets, and hence is unable to deal 
with changes in business systems over time.  
More recently, increasing attention has been paid to understanding complex 
differences between national business systems in the institutions governing how product, 
labour and financial markets work and how market actors relate to each other (e.g. Lane, 
1989; Hall and Soskice, 2000; Whitley, 1999). Such cross-national differences place various 
degrees of constraint on the international dissemination of practices within MNCs (Ferner, 
1997; Whitley 2001). 
This „comparative-institutionalist‟ approach, rooted in traditions of comparative 
historical research (e.g. Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2003), draws on, but in many respects 
goes beyond, the American strand of „new institutionalism‟ (e.g. DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983; Scott, 1995; Zucker, 1988). The new institutionalism emphasizes the importance of 
normative and cognitive frameworks in understanding organizations‟ behaviour. It has only 
recently turned its attention to conceptualizing the interaction of different national 
institutional frameworks (see e.g. Kostova and Zaheer, 1999; Kostova and Roth, 2002; 
Tempel and Walgenbach, 2003). 
Kostova (1999) has proposed the concept of „institutional distance‟ as a key variable 
in the transferability of practices between national institutional domains. Institutional distance 
is the difference between the „country institutional profile‟ (CIP) of the country of origin and 
country of operation respectively. The CIP construct provides indices of the regulatory, 
normative and cognitive institutions of a country (borrowing from Scott‟s institutional „three 
pillars‟, 1995). Kostova cites the example of a CIP for equal employment opportunity in the 
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United States. This would comprise the regulatory institutions such as the relevant 
legislation; cognitive institutions, i.e. people‟s shared social knowledge on equal opportunity; 
and normative institutions, i.e. people‟s beliefs, values, and norms concerning equal 
opportunity. 
For Kostova, if a practice is not consistent with the recipient country‟s cognitive 
institutions (i.e. those establishing taken-for-granted routines of thought and action, and 
models for interpreting reality - Scott, 1995), subsidiary employees are likely to have 
difficulty in interpreting and judging the practice correctly, and hence transfer will be 
impeded. National-institutional factors thus interact with the individual properties of 
practices; for instance, as Lam (1997) shows, work organization systems tend to be less 
codified and more tacit in the Japanese business system, impeding their smooth transfer to the 
UK. Conversely, US MNCs, because of the existence in the American business context of 
systems for codifying and disseminating knowledge, have a greater organizational capacity 
for coordinating globally dispersed learning (Lam, 2003).  
In addition to „institutional distance‟, transfer between different business systems is 
likely to be shaped by macro-level power relations between countries. Smith and Meiksins 
(1995) have coined the term „dominance effects‟ to describe the hierarchical relationships 
between national economies within the global economy. Firms from countries lower in the 
hierarchy may perceive an interest in adopting practices from those based in more dominant 
economies. Conversely, firms in dominant economies may tend to assume that their practices 
are superior and capable of transfer to less dominant hosts.  
Transfer is not an either-or matter. A transferred practice can be implemented in the 
subsidiary in a variety of ways. A growing literature exists on the transmutation or 
„hybridization‟ of internationally transferred policies (e.g. Boyer et al., 1998; Cutcher-
Gershenfeld et al., 1998: ch. 3; Doeringer et al. 2003; 2000). Indeed, Tolliday et al. (1998: 1-
2) argue that „systems cannot be transferred without being significantly reshaped…. 
Hybridization… is inevitable.‟ Hybridization arises from „interaction with different national, 
legal, or institutional systems; different political contexts; different labour markets and skill 
structures; different infrastructures‟ (p.4), as firms attempt to make practices drawn from one 
„social and economic space‟ compatible with the constraints and opportunities of the host 
environment. Though writers such as Boyer et al. see hybridization as playing a critical role 
in organizational learning, other writers are concerned with the loss of functionality of 
practices transferred from their original location. Kostova (1999) draws a distinction between 
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„implementation‟ and „internalization‟ in the host subsidiary. Implementation involves formal 
adherence to the practice; internalization refers to the way in which employees attach 
meaning to the practice or „infuse it with value‟. In other words, she is concerned with 
cognitive and normative integration of the practice within the subsidiary.  
Power, interests and the cross-national transfer of practices 
Much of the literature on transfer implicitly adopts a rationalistic, unitary view of the 
corporation. Transfer takes place where top management see it as a source of international 
competitive advantage (e.g. Florkowski, 1996; Taylor et al., 1996). In such analyses, the 
interests and rationale guiding the behaviour of other actors within the MNC are not generally 
considered. As a result, there is inadequate exploration of the importance of power relations 
in mediating the transfer of policies. 
In the mainstream business literature, power is not altogether neglected. An important 
strand (e.g. in the work of Taylor et al., 1996; Martínez and Ricks, 1991) is the concept of 
resource dependency, drawing particularly on Pfeffer and Salancik (1978). Taylor et al. 
(1996: 975), for example, note that headquarters „will attempt to exert high levels of control 
over their global innovators, but these affiliates will simultaneously have the power to resist 
these central efforts‟ (p. 975). However, there is little elaboration of the dynamics of parent–
subsidiary power relations.  
An important exception to this failure to explore power dynamics is the work of 
Birkinshaw (see Birkinshaw, 2000; Birkinshaw and Fry, 1998; Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998), 
which has focused attention in recent years on the way in which subsidiaries build up 
resources and „capabilities‟ (the capacity to deploy resources) over time. Birkinshaw is 
primarily concerned with the way in which subsidiaries pursue global „charters‟. However, 
his analysis is pertinent to the issue of policy transfer, since it throws light on the resources 
available to subsidiaries to negotiate the „terms of transfer‟. Thus subsidiaries engage in a 
political process, based on „proactive, pushy, and sometimes Machiavellian tactics‟ 
(Birkinshaw and Fry, 1998: 52), whereby they acquire credibility, reputation, and „track 
record‟; network with key personnel at the corporate centre; and construct international 
alliances and coalitions with other groups within the MNC.   
If subsidiaries have power resources and the ability to resist transfer, then it is likely, 
as Birkinshaw has shown for the case of charter-building, that transfer will be a negotiated 
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process, rather than an „either-or‟ one, and that, for example, a practice may be transferred to 
a subsidiary in a form modified by negotiation with subsidiary actors. Negotiation may take 
place with senior subsidiary management, or at lower levels within the subsidiary where, as 
Cutcher-Gershenfeld et al. (1998: 46) observe, „negotiation‟ includes „informal interactions in 
which practices are considered, debated, tested, and incorporated into people‟s daily 
routines‟.  
The importance of power and interests in the transfer process raises questions about 
the new institutionalist approach. Unlike some of the more rationalistic resource-based 
models of policy transfer, this approach is sensitive to processes in the subsidiary. For 
example, new institutionalists have begun to explore competing „isomorphic‟ pulls
1
 from 
institutional frameworks within the MNC and within the local institutional domain (e.g. 
Rosenzweig and Singh, 1991; Rosenzweig and Nohria, 1994; Kostova and Zaheer, 1999). 
Kostova (1999), as discussed, considers the taken-for-granted cognitive and normative 
frameworks of subsidiary employees in the „internalization‟ of transferred policy. But, in 
common with new institutionalists generally (see DiMaggio, 1988), she pays scant attention 
to the role of power and interests in this process.  
Nonetheless, as Oliver (1991) has persuasively argued, it is in principle possible to 
synthesize the insights of the new institutionalism with those of a power-based perspective. 
Oliver explores the scope for organizations to negotiate over the terms of their conformity to 
institutional pressures. Organizations are able to deploy a range of strategic responses, 
running from full adherence, through avoidance (e.g. hiding non-conformity under a façade 
of ritual compliance) and compromise, to full-blooded resistance. Compromise emerges, for 
example, where there are conflicting institutional demands and expectations; defiance is 
likely to occur when the organization‟s „internal interests diverge dramatically from external 
values‟ (p.157). In general, the variables that influence such strategic responses include the 
dependency of the organization on the source of institutional norms; the perceived legitimacy 
of the norm; the efficiency gains from conformity; and the multiplicity and consistency of 
institutional constituents – as Oliver argues (p.162), the „collective normative order of the 
environment… is not necessarily unitary or coherent‟.  
Oliver‟s analytical framework has clear relevance for the transfer of practices within 
MNCs between national institutional domains. In particular, management in the host 
subsidiary is subject to rival institutional pressures emanating from at least two normative, 
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cognitive and regulatory frameworks, that of the local environment and that of the parent 
company and (indirectly) its country of origin. This creates conditions in which subsidiary 
resources can be deployed to shape the impact of institutional pressures. Moreover, the MNC 
headquarters–subsidiary relationship gives rise to a situation in which distinct cognitive 
frameworks exist side by side. This juxtaposition may allow normally concealed and „taken-
for-granted‟ cognitive schemas and their underlying assumptions to be rendered „visible‟, and 
hence subject to manipulation or challenge. In the new institutionalist approach, cognitive 
frameworks are divorced from a power perspective. But they may be seen as a terrain for the 
mobilization of power and interests as different organizational groups seek to win control 
over the meanings, assumptions, and definitions of organizational practices and processes.  
The question of transfer between national institutional frameworks links directly with 
issues of power and interests. Not only do institutional structures in the host country directly 
constrain the scope for international transfer of policies within MNCs; in addition, actors in 
the subsidiary derive power resources from their embeddedness in the local institutional 
context. For example, subsidiary managers‟ role as „interpreters‟ of the limitations and 
possibilities of corporate action in the local environment gives them power to negotiate over 
the terms of transfer of policies, since the significance for corporate action of local business 
institutions is to a degree indeterminate. Moreover, local managers are involved in close 
relationships with other local actors within institutionally-influenced (or even prescribed) 
structures, such as collective bargaining machineries or forms of collective employee 
involvement such as works councils. This may increase the incentive for local managers to 
resist transfers of practices in case they disrupt existing relationships. As noted, Boyer et al. 
(1998) argue that transfer leads to a process of „creative‟ hybridization whereby an original 
practice undergoes dynamic modification and improvement. Equally, however, from a power 
perspective, subsidiaries may use their power resources to deflect a practice from its original 
function or content, leading to what might be called „resistive‟ hybridization, or to engage in 
ritual compliance that drains the practice of meaning (cf. Oliver, 1991). 
Drawing on this review, we may formulate the following key issues concerning the 
international transfer of workforce diversity practices within MNCs. First, to what extent do 
diversity agendas reflect institutional elements specific to the country of origin? How far, 
moreover, do factors such as system dominance effects shape perceptions of the 
transferability and competitive advantage of diversity policies? Second, to what extent and in 
what manner is the original policy hybridized in the recipient unit? Third, to what extent do 
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power resources deriving from cross-national differences in institutional environments affect 
the transfer process? 
 
Workforce ‘diversity’ and the US business system 
The argument of this section is that „diversity‟ as an internationally diffusable HR agenda 
within US MNCs was profoundly marked by the unresolved tensions in the diversity mix in 
the US, particularly between equal opportunities and „business case‟ strands. These tensions 
have given rise to what might be called a „contested institutional terrain‟.  
Writers frequently distinguish „diversity‟, based on a voluntary corporate approach to 
„valuing difference‟, from equal employment opportunities (EEO) or affirmative action (AA) 
agendas driven by a legislative programme requiring compliance from companies. In this 
paper, „diversity‟ is used broadly to encompass both elements, while „management of 
diversity‟ refers more specifically to the proactive and voluntary development of initiatives at 
company level.  
The diversity agenda in the USA has been conditioned by a historical legacy of social 
and racial heterogeneity and associated tensions deriving first from slavery and then mass 
immigration (Kurowski, 2002). This has influenced diversity through two main routes. First, 
minorities, and women, drove a civil rights movement from the 1960s that, in parallel with 
mounting urban and racial tensions, changed the legislative and political environment for 
business (e.g. Bond and Pile, 1998). A series of legislative measures were passed (Dessler, 
2001: chapter 2), beginning with the 1964 Civil Rights Act whose Title VII outlawed 
discrimination on the basis of race, colour, religion, sex, and national origin, and set up the 
Equal Employment Opportunities Commission (EEOC) to investigate and act on job 
discrimination. Executive orders were introduced requiring companies doing business with 
the US government to have written AA policies. Further legislation made it unlawful for 
employers to engage in pay discrimination on the basis of sex or age, or to discriminate 
against qualified disabled individuals. Thus employers were forced to take employment 
diversity into account, in a climate in which lapses could entail costly, high-profile legal 
action. 
Second, demographic trends have shaped employers‟ diversity strategies. By 2000, 
ethnic minorities were 29 per cent of the total workforce, up from 22 per cent in the mid-
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1980s, with blacks accounting for 14 per cent and Hispanic groups 10 percent (EEOC, 2000). 
Women represented 47 per cent of the total labour force, and were in the majority among 
black groups. Moreover, minorities and women represented customers as well as potential 
employees: the combined buying power of African, Hispanic and Asian Americans is 
estimated to be in the region of $750bn (SHRM, 2002).  
These demographic trends have been a major factor in the emergence of corporate 
diversity initiatives since the 1980s. The management of diversity has been underpinned, both 
for academic observers (e.g. Richard, 2000) and for practitioners (e.g. SHRM, 2002), by a 
move from a concern with compliance to consideration of the „business case‟. Essentially the 
business case rests on the competitive advantage to be derived from three broad elements: 
attracting and retaining skilled workers; servicing increasingly diverse markets; and 
improving organizational creativity and learning (e.g. Cox, 1994; Dass and Parker, 1999; 
SHRM, 2002). However, the evidence is far from conclusive on the link between diversity 
and business performance (Kochan et al., 2003; Jehn et al., 1999). 
Despite the strength and visibility of the diversity agenda in the US, there are 
unresolved tensions both within and between the diversity and equal opportunities agendas. 
First, equality legislation in the US has lacked supporting systems of social regulation. 
Comparative analyses of equality (e.g. Whitehouse, 1992) have emphasized the importance to 
outcomes of interlocking legal and social regulations. That is, legal mechanisms, however 
strong, do not tend to deliver equality unless they are underpinned by embedded social 
mechanisms. For example, the inability of groups to enforce their legal rights as a result of 
factors such as gaps in their legal knowledge creates the space for continued discrimination at 
organizational level. In European countries, unions and collective bargaining are important 
elements of social regulation underpinning legal frameworks of equality, helping to build and 
enforce legal rights. However, such social supports are far weaker in the US business system. 
Second, it has been suggested that diversity can offer a rationale for perpetuating 
inequalities, providing an „alibi‟ for failing to address continuing unfairness experienced by 
groups of employees (Kirton and Greene, 2000: 114-115). Rival conceptions of the notion of 
AA have become a political and cultural battleground, and the „management of diversity‟ 
rhetoric may be seen in the context of periodic bouts of corporate and political lobbying to 
roll back legislative regulation in favour of a voluntary corporate-level approach (cf. Dickens, 
1999). The trend to corporate diversity agendas accelerated in the late 1980s at a time when 
the second Reagan administration was cutting back the monitoring and enforcement of 
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EEO/AA policies (Bond and Pile, 1998). A symptom of the equivocal attitude of corporate 
America is the continuing proliferation of high profile litigation, backed by the EEOC, 
against some of the country‟s major employers (see e.g. EEOC, 2003). Multiplying 
legislative provisions to extend or clarify the legal framework, and a huge backlog of work 
for the EEOC (Baker, 2002), have created long delays for plaintiffs and the danger of what 
Bond and Pile (1998) call „litigious gridlock‟: such developments, when coupled with 
periodic challenge to AA, raise questions the solidity of the „regulatory pillar‟ of the 
institutional framework. 
Third, there are tensions between a collective approach to managing diverse employee 
groups, and a more individualized approach focusing on individual needs and abilities which 
may serve to accentuate rather than decrease inequalities (e.g. Agócs and Burr, 1996; Liff, 
1997). This may be illustrated by the definition of „diversity‟ itself. It has become 
increasingly slippery, used in an all-embracing fashion to include not just the social 
categories of AA such as race and sex but a wide range of personal characteristics. For 
example, for the SHRM (2002), „diversity encompasses an infinite range of individuals‟ 
unique characteristics and experiences, including communication styles, physical 
characteristics such as height and weight, and speed of learning and comprehension‟. 
Underlying such uncertainties are unresolved debates between rival conceptions of equity 
based on paradigms of equality of treatment and equality of outcome, which themselves 
reflect the ongoing strains between multicultural and „melting pot‟ conceptions of American 
society (Bond and Pile, 1998).  
Fifth, and relatedly, it has been noted that the rhetoric of diversity tends to shift the 
emphasis from employee interests in equity and fairness to managerial interests in efficiency 
(Bond and Pile, 1998; Kirby and Harter, 2003). A „business case‟ approach raises the 
possibility that the case may become weaker as market conditions change, or even that a 
business case may be articulated against diversity policies: for example, there may be 
management cost and control advantages in exploiting women workers, or in closing off 
recruitment systems to women or ethnic minorities (e.g. Dickens, 1999). Some observers 
have argued that the exploitation of ethnic and gender divisions has historically been a crucial 
management strategy in the US labour market (e.g. Gordon et al., 1982).  
Finally, there is evidence (Bond and Pile, 1998) that the diversity agenda, both in its 
legislative and voluntarist forms, has provoked a significant backlash, particularly where it 
has coincided with periods of corporate downsizing and stagnating real incomes. Within 
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companies, diversity programmes bring the danger of loss of status and security for white 
men, while organizational cultures have not changed enough to support diversity initiatives 
adequately: the outlawing of overt discrimination has encouraged the rise of underground or 
„aversive‟ racism at work (Bond and Pile, 1998).  
In short, therefore, the institutional embeddedness of diversity is in many respects 
uncertain, changeable and beset with tensions.  
Against this somewhat ambiguous background, formal diversity management 
programmes are now well-developed in most large US companies. Three-quarters of the 
largest corporations had some form of diversity management in the late 1990s (Egan and 
Bendick, 2001: 2), incorporating a wide range of elements including leadership programmes; 
corporate values; recruitment and retention systems; career development, promotion and the 
management of high potentials; training programmes; structures of involvement such as 
„diversity councils‟ and „affinity groups‟; community relations; and supplier relations.  
The evidence on the management of diversity in US MNCs is limited, and studies 
have been small-scale (Egan and Bendick, 2001; Wentling and Palma-Rivas, 2000). 
However, it suggests that in the latter part of the 1990s, companies began to transfer diversity 
programmes to their overseas operations. Wentling and Palma-Rivas (2000) argue that this 
reflected US companies‟ increasingly diverse global workforce. Initiatives abroad were 
generally fewer and less aggressive. However, the basic framework of diversity tended to be 
the same as at home. This „parallelism‟ (Egan and Bendick, 2001) was reflected in a common 
global mission and corporate values; the use of global diversity teams; common 
administrative structures; common training programmes; and affinity groups, particularly for 
women. However, foreign subsidiaries were generally given autonomy to adapt policy to 
local concerns.  
US MNCs transferring diversity policies to the UK are not, of course, operating on a 
clean slate: there is an important regulatory context both in the European Union and in 
Britain (see Johnson and Johnstone, 2000). In most European countries there is a 
„complaints-based‟ approach which seeks to redress discrimination against individuals. By 
contrast, the UK adopts an „anti-discrimination law‟ approach aiming to counter inequality 
and protect vulnerable and disadvantaged groups. Thus legislation outlaws discrimination in 
pay and employment on the grounds of gender, national origin, ethnicity, and disability. The 
key pieces of legislation are the Sex Discrimination Act 1986, the Race Relations Act 1976, 
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and the Disability Discrimination Act 1995. The European Union‟s Employment Directive of 
2000 required the UK also to introduce new prohibitions on employment discrimination 
relating to religion, sexual orientation, and age. Regulations covering the first two came into 
force in December 2003, while age regulations will be enacted by 2006. 
Nonetheless, while the UK legal tradition in this area draws on US legislation (Liff 
and Wajcman, 1996), it has generally emphasized equality of opportunity or „equal 
treatment‟, rather than equality of outcomes, and positive discrimination has been generally 
discouraged. It is also argued (see Johnson and Johnstone, 2000) that the effectiveness of UK 
anti-discrimination legislation is undermined by the individual nature of the legal remedies. 
Unlike the US system of class actions, which acts as a  „cost-maximizing‟ deterrent to 
delinquent employers, in the UK each affected individual has to bring a separate claim. 
Further, the evolution of British equality legislation was quite different from the US; unions 
have played more prominent roles in its development through collective bargaining, 
lobbying, and direct legal action, both on behalf of members in specific test cases and against 
the UK government to secure general policy changes (see Colling and Dickens 2001; Heery 
1998; McColgan 2002: 380-2).).  
More broadly, the labour market context for diversity policy is markedly different in 
Britain. Although, as in the USA, race-based discrimination has emerged as a major policy 
issue at various junctures, ethnic minorities account for only 9 per cent of the total population 
in the UK, compared with nearly 30 per cent in the USA. In the UK, gender has been the 
primary basis of labour market segmentation (for example, 41 per cent of women work part-
time in Britain, compared with 18 per cent in the US).  
 
Methodology 
The arguments of this paper are based on empirical data from a study of HRM in US MNCs 
in the UK, financed by the UK Economic and Social Research Council. This is part of a 
wider comparative study of US MNCs in Europe exploring the influence of the US business 
system on employment relations of US MNCs and their subsidiaries in different host 
environments.  
Hall (2003: 393) refers to „systematic process analysis‟ as a methodological approach 
in which the primary aim is to investigate the processes whereby hypothesized causal 
variables – in this case, institutional aspects of the US business system – generate (or fail to 
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generate) a particular outcome, in this case a pattern of international transfer of diversity 
policies. This emphasis on processual issues favours the use of an in-depth case-study 
methodology rather than a quantitative large-N approach. The former permits the detailed 
unravelling of complex causal linkages and in particular the dynamics of informal bargaining 
processes between HQ and subsidiary within MNCs, in a way not permitted by statistical 
analysis. Case studies are particularly appropriate where, as here, the precise nature and 
significance of the „dependent variable‟ in its specific national-institutional context is itself 
problematic and in need of investigation. By the same token, however, we would 
acknowledge the limitation of a small-N study which does not allow broad generalizations to 
be drawn about the patterns of occurrence of the dependent variable. 
Detailed case studies (see table 1) were carried out between 1999 and 2003 in five US 
MNCs, in IT, chemically-based consumer and industrial products, engineering contracting, 
and mechanical engineering (two firms). We refer to these as the „core‟ case studies. The 
companies were chosen in order to cover a range of industries with varying degrees of 
international integration of operations. They also encompass major differences in HR and 
employment relations traditions in the USA, particularly between traditionally unionized 
firms and sophisticated non-union companies. More limited access was obtained in a further 
eight companies. Data from seven of these firms have been excluded from the analysis as we 
were not able to obtain triangulating data from corporate HQ on the diversity issue.  
However, one further firm (Business Services), for which triangulation was obtained, is 
included in the analysis.  
Pseudonyms are used since access was granted on condition of anonymity. For the 
same reason, description of particular incidents or policies is kept vague in some places to 
avoid identification. 
 
[table 1 about here] 
 
Data were collected from 118 respondents in the six companies. Interviews were 
conducted with senior HR, finance and operations managers in UK subsidiaries. In each of 
the five core companies, 5-10 non-managerial employees were interviewed, and in one, a 
group interview was conducted with six members of a site-based „diversity council‟. In all the 
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companies, interviews were conducted with senior managers at US HQ. Interviews were also 
conducted in some cases at European and international business unit HQ. Respondents were 
asked about the existence of diversity policies; how these were devised, implemented and 
monitored; specific diversity issues that arose; the relationship between diversity and other 
policies such as working time and work–life balance; and the structures used to apply 
diversity policy.  
Interviews were taped, transcribed, and coded using QSR N5 data analysis software. 
A wide range of documentary material was collected from source such as SEC filings and 
company websites. This was used to provide evidence of the formal language and profile of 
diversity initiatives in different companies. Information was collected from respondents on 
the nature of international diversity initiatives; the rationale of diversity policy; structures at 
local and HQ level for managing diversity; the mechanisms through which diversity policy 
was implemented, monitored and enforced; subsidiaries‟ reactions to transferred policies; and 
the tensions between transferred policy and local customary and legislative constraints. 
„Diversity‟ was an „emergent‟ issue, rather than a focus of the research from the 
outset. However, the longitudinal element of the case-study methodology permitted the 
exploration of diversity issues in all six companies once the issue had been identified as 
significant.  
 
Empirical findings: the transfer of workforce ‘diversity’ 
policies in US MNCs 
This section first considers the companies‟ domestic diversity agenda and the rationale for 
internationalizing it. It then describes the substance of international diversity policy. Finally, 
it explores the reaction of subsidiary management to the transfer of diversity initiatives, 
focusing on the power of subsidiaries to resist or modify central policy. 
The domestic diversity agenda and internationalization 
 Most of the case-study companies had well-developed domestic policies for managing 
diversity, generally underpinned by a hard-headed business rationale. The three elements of a 
business case referred to earlier were present in varying degrees. The first was to maximize 
„access to the pool of talented people‟ (HQ HR manager, Engco2), particularly those with 
scarce technical and professional skills. The second was to achieve a workforce composition 
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more representative of the customer base. The third was to enhance creativity by avoiding a 
„cloned‟ workforce and harnessing multiple perspectives - „leveraging difference‟ as an HQ 
manager in Engco2 called it. In short, companies saw diversity as allowing them to compete 
effectively in labour markets as well as product markets, and to outwit competitors by 
exploiting the creativity of difference.  
There were also tensions within domestic policy, however, reflecting wider strains in 
the diversity agenda discussed earlier. Thus at least three of the core case-study companies 
had been the subject of recent EEOC-initiated lawsuits for sexual and racial discrimination in 
their manufacturing plants. The EEO framework was seen as burdensome even where firms 
complied: in one firm, for example, HQ managers referred to the constraints imposed on 
managerial freedom of action by the stringent application in the courts of the principle of 
„disparate impact‟ (i.e. where actions indirectly discriminate against a group), particularly in 
the context of downsizing and redundancy.  
The uneasy coexistence of EEO and diversity agendas was present in the mindset of 
American HR managers. In the words of one (white, male) manager, „when we say diversity, 
it‟s diversity in work locations, it is work assignments, if you look at myself, I‟ve been in 
purchasing, I‟ve been in HR, I‟ve been in operations, I‟ve been in logistics. That‟s workforce 
diversity, not the colour of my skin, my gender‟. There was also evident concern with the 
„backlash‟ against diversity. One (female) senior HQ manager spoke of the danger that white 
male employees‟ discontent with diversity would drive them into the arms of the union: 
What will happen is the white males will look at it and will see that women, 
minorities, everybody else has somebody to speak for them in one fashion or another, 
or is protected in one fashion or another, who‟s going to look after me as the white 
male?  I might go to a union and look at a union as being the only group that would 
look after or speak for me. 
In this company, for which a non-union approach was a longstanding article of faith, it is easy 
therefore to see considerable strains emerging between diversity and employee relations 
strategies. Ironically, the development of diversity policy had been an indirect response to 
racial tensions in the US plants. The diagnosis was that „HR was not seen to be independent 
in any way and was … purely a tool of management‟, and the US response „was to underline 
and enlarge essentially the independent role of HR as an advocate of employee interests‟. The 
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enhancement of the HR role provided the impetus for the emergence of systematic diversity 
policy (not just in the US but world-wide).  
The business case logic favoured the extension of diversity policies to international 
operations, where competitive advantage required the ability to attract scarce labour market 
skills, and a refined understanding of national and regional characteristics. And with the 
globalization of markets, corporate learning and creativity at the international level was 
becoming increasingly important.  
Elements of international diversity programmes 
The global diversity structures tended to develop out of existing domestic structures. ITco, 
Engco2 and CPGco all set up global diversity „leadership teams‟ which incorporated 
representatives from businesses and regions around the world in structures such as „diversity 
councils‟. This machinery was replicated at regional and country level and in some cases at 
individual sites. Engco2, for example, created site diversity councils at which managers and 
employees discussed the local application of corporate diversity policies. However, 
machinery was rarely as elaborate as domestically. (This and other aspects of international 
diversity policy in the core case-study companies are summarized in table 2 below.) 
 
 [table 2 about here] 
 
Diversity was often incorporated as a corporate value within the companies‟ mission 
or values statements. Diversity programmes were extensively publicized on corporate 
websites, workforce diversity metrics were displayed, and a multitude of awards recognizing 
diversity achievements were trumpeted. Some companies also had global in-house awards for 
services to diversity. Finally, international diversity initiatives were sometimes accompanied 
by global training programmes. In Engco2, training was centrally mandated, designed and 
delivered in standardized form by consultants globally.  
The substance of international diversity varied, but there were a number of common 
features. First, gender policies were pervasive, while policies on ethnicity, disability and 
sexual orientation were more variable from company to company. Policy on women included 
„affinity groups‟ and mentoring systems for women employees, and targets for women in 
high potential groups, promotion pools, or managerial positions. Second, companies 
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generally provided only a broad international framework rather than globally standardized 
policies. Within this framework, subsidiaries could develop locally appropriate policies. But 
subsidiaries could not evade or reject diversity: they were required (e.g. in CPGco, Engco2, 
and Business Services) to develop a diversity policy against which they would be judged. 
Third, the companies that most emphasized international diversity required subsidiaries to set 
targets against which they were closely monitored. In some cases, targets were promulgated 
centrally: e.g. Engco2 HQ set regions a target of one woman in place in regional leadership 
teams. Fourth, there was regular collection of diversity „metrics‟ by higher levels and 
ultimately by head office. Finally, in CPGco and Engco2 notably, senior managers were set 
individual diversity targets within the performance management process. Metrics, such as 
improvements in employee satisfaction on diversity issues in periodic workforce surveys, 
were used in performance assessment alongside more qualitative measures.  
Perceptions of diversity in the subsidiaries 
The perception by US HQ managers was that diversity policies were successfully driving 
change globally. A CPGco HQ manager, for example, argued that targets for women in 
management positions were allowing women in the Japanese subsidiary to break out of their 
traditional ghetto of administrative and clerical roles.  
But from the vantage point of the subsidiaries, while respondents were generally 
favourable to diversity as a concept, there was a strong perception that global policy was 
being driven by parochial US problems, leading to initiatives inappropriate for a non-US 
environment. In one company, European managers saw the globalization of the diversity 
agenda as a response to severe racial tensions in domestic US plants and to the ensuing 
litigation. They could not see why the resulting suite of policies for developing a more 
inclusive corporate culture should be transposed wholesale to European operations: „the 
initial plan was rolling out a solution to the [US] situation, around the world, and many of us 
pushed back very hard against that‟ (UK HR manager).  
Similarly, in Engco2, a UK HR manager complained that the corporate anti-
harassment policy referred to bodies like the Ku Klux Klan which were irrelevant in the 
British context. Monitoring of diversity was often biased towards American preoccupations. 
According to members of a UK plant-based diversity council in Engco2, US monitoring of 
ethnic groups in the workforce was based on American categories that were inappropriate in 
the UK; and with ethnic minority representation in Engco2‟s local labour market under 2 per 
cent, ethnic diversity was not a major priority.  
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UK subsidiaries were also aware of tensions in the US parent over the implementation 
of diversity. As a UK HR manager reported, following a global HR directors‟ meeting at 
corporate HQ, 
What I discovered was the most off-field mob in terms of responding to all this 
[diversity agenda] was, we‟ve got a plant in Colorado… the HR guy there at the bar in 
the evening was very frank about how dismissive he was about all this stuff, you 
know he‟d a plant full of cowboys and they weren‟t really interested in diversity, 
didn‟t mean much to 500 cowboys in Colorado, so everybody has their own response 
to this. 
Targets, particularly for women in management positions, could be seen as 
excessively rigid by UK managers. European managers rejected the principle of affirmative 
action that was implicit in targets to increase the percentage of women managers, not only 
because it could be seen to be at odds with UK and EU legislation outlawing positive 
discrimination, but because of its demotivating impact on male managers. Several European 
managers in CPGco were sceptical about the principle of targets which they saw as doing 
little to remove the real barriers to the advancement of women and ethnic minorities in the 
company; such inhibitors included other aspects of US MNC practice, notably the pervasive 
long hours culture. 
The thrust of subsidiary comment, therefore, was that global diversity policy was 
problematic in terms of local priorities. The advantages of diversity derived to a large degree 
from pressures and opportunities specific to the American business system, and even there 
they were not always apparent. To the extent that the potential for international competitive 
advantage existed, it could be negated by the diffusion of policy measures that were not 
suited to host environments. Finally, even though most managers were receptive in principle, 
few non-managerial respondents felt that diversity policy impacted significantly on them, 
with the occasional exception of diversity training. 
UK subsidiary responses: resistance, avoidance and accommodation 
The response of subsidiaries to the perceived „parochialism‟ of global diversity policies can 
be explored in terms of Oliver‟s (1991) categories of strategic response to institutional 
pressures. Generally subsidiaries tried to negotiate the terms of application of policy in their 
local context. They were able to mobilize resources that allowed them to resist what they saw 
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as inappropriate centrally-imposed policies. First, they exploited the legal constraints referred 
to above. This involved „interpreting‟ the implications of the law. In CPGco, for example,  
We have argued that if we were seen to have targets [for women in management 
positions] then that would implicitly be positive discrimination. I don‟t know strictly 
from a legal point of view whether that would be … but I guess that‟s what essentially 
fended off too explicit a target. (UK HR manager) 
Second, subsidiaries could also point to the „objective‟ structural features of labour 
markets. In companies such as CPGco and Engco2, employees tended to be long-stayers, 
generations from the same family often worked side by side, and turnover rates were very 
low. (By contrast, turnover was around 12 per cent in key segments of the workforce in ITco, 
allowing diversity policy potentially to have a fairly rapid impact on workforce composition.) 
Such factors combined with stagnating or falling employee numbers, further inhibiting a 
change in workforce composition. Engco2 had taken steps to increase the proportion of 
women in the pool of temporary workers from which it recruited its permanent employees, 
but temps were the first to go in a downturn. Such structural factors were used to justify very 
limited progress on diversity goals. For example, in both major UK plants of Engco2, the 
proportion of women in shopfloor jobs was below 5 per cent; by comparison, in the sister 
plant in the US the figure was almost 40 per cent.  
Finally, given the pervasive slipperiness of the concept, subsidiaries could deploy the 
rhetoric of diversity to build the case for alternative, Europe-centred, conceptions of diversity 
to challenge the corporate definition. Thus several companies questioned the lack of non-US 
managers in senior posts. Subsidiary managers stressed repeatedly that Europe was already 
„diverse‟, and that in relevant respects the USA was not.  
The outcome of this combination of structural constraints and rhetorical tactics was, 
de facto, a process of negotiation with the centre over the terms of application of diversity 
policy in the European subsidiaries. In CPGco, HQ was frustrated at slow progress in 
achieving targets for women in senior posts; the subsidiary countered by stressing the law 
against quotas and positive discrimination but also proposed a locally more appropriate 
response based on encouraging women with management potential, pressing recruitment 
agencies to include more women on short lists, and establishing networks of women 
managers. This was seen as a strategy of support rather than one of „positive discrimination‟. 
In CPGco‟s manufacturing operation, similar accommodations were visible. Local managers 
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accepted that some constructive response to HQ pressure was necessary, and indeed 
desirable, but tried to shape policy to local needs. As one manager put it, „what we‟ve learned 
how to do… is to listen to what they say and decide what we‟re going to do and put it under 
that same banner‟.  
There was an added incentive to negotiate over diversity where it impacted on a 
manager‟s individual targets and, potentially, his or her performance-related remuneration. In 
CPGco, the operations manager realized that his HQ-based line manager would oblige him to 
include diversity objectives in his performance targets, but he had been successful „in saying 
don‟t count, look at the behaviour, the things we‟ve put in place, and measure me on how 
much progress I‟m making with those‟. Instead of setting quantitative targets, he launched an 
initiative with site unions to look at obstacles to diversity in the blue-collar workforce. In the 
same company, the UK HR manager‟s objectives were set by a US-based HR director whose 
responsibilities included global corporate diversity. However, the local manager resisted 
formal diversity objectives on the grounds that they ignored the great bulk of his day-to-day 
HR activity, under-emphasized local diversity initiatives, and created potential legal 
difficulties. The result was a wary, inconclusive dialogue: 
I would say the process is we‟re circling one another about that whole issue….  In 
theory we‟re supposed to agree [objectives], and I guess we never really do.  This is 
embarrassing, as an HR man….  But we are in the middle of a struggle with this over 
quite what global management of HR means. 
  
Discussion: the transfer of diversity policies, power, and 
institutions 
The findings show a pattern of uneasy subsidiary accommodation to transferred diversity 
policies. The „isomorphic pulls‟ exerted by corporate headquarters were not sufficient to 
ensure what Oliver (1991) terms subsidiary „acquiescence‟, that is full compliance in form 
and spirit with institutional pressures. The US diversity agenda rarely became assimilated to 
taken-for-granted normative and cognitive schemas of subsidiary managers, although 
conformity to the „regulatory‟ pressures of HQ policy was generally observed. To put it 
another way, though diversity policy was „implemented‟, the process of „infusing with value‟ 
and „internalizing‟ (Kostova, 1999) was at best incomplete. Although cases of open defiance 
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were rare, direct resistance was occasionally evident, as in the stubborn resistance of the HR 
manager to agreeing diversity targets with his US boss.  
Oliver‟s other categories of strategic response were also observed in the case 
companies. „Compromise‟, in which the organization tries „to balance, pacify, or bargain with 
external constituents‟ (Oliver, 1999: 154) was seen in CPGco which deflected HQ‟s target-
setting approach while offering concessions in the form of alternative support structures and 
initiatives to understand the causes of low ethnic and female participation. „Avoidance‟, 
characterized by ritual conformity, could be detected in the lip service paid to diversity by 
subsidiaries even while their female and ethnic participation rate remained stubbornly low in 
absolute terms and relative to equivalent plants in the US.  
The evidence also illustrates the contextual factors that generate this pattern of 
subsidiary responses. In particular, the institutional terrain of diversity was contested in a 
double sense. First, despite similarities, the regulatory, cognitive and normative domain of 
diversity and EEO was distinct in the US and the UK, making it harder for US HQs to assert 
the primacy of their own „taken-for-granted‟ schemas. Thus subsidiary managers were able to 
mobilize their resistance on the basis of differences in regulatory frameworks of diversity in 
the two countries. Second, the domain of diversity was riven by tensions of principle, practice 
and interest within the US business system (and indeed within the UK). In other words, it was 
only partially institutionalized. This again made it difficult to establish the hegemony of a HQ 
conception of diversity policy, particularly since managers both at HQ and in the subsidiaries 
were aware of the stresses. In terms of Oliver‟s arguments (1999: 161), the perceived 
legitimacy of the diversity agenda was not strongly established in the minds of UK 
subsidiaries (or even in the US). To put the point differently, „internalization‟ in the 
subsidiary seems unlikely if it has not even occurred at the centre. Part of the reason for the 
incomplete institutionalization of diversity appears to lie in unresolved debates about its 
efficiency. The perceived benefits of diversity were at best ambiguous, particularly in the UK 
context where the demographic forces for diversity were weaker than in the US. Such doubts 
over what Oliver calls „economic fitness‟ (p.161) were again likely to inhibit full subsidiary 
compliance with the diversity agenda. 
The findings throw light on the gambits of resistance and negotiation used by 
subsidiary managers to take advantage of their potential room for manoeuvre on diversity. 
They were able to derive bargaining resources from their rootedness within the specific 
institutional configuration of the host country, wielding arguments e.g. about legislative 
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constraints. But at the same time, their capacity to deploy resources effectively depended, as 
Birkinshaw and Fry (1998) propose, on their ability to maintain credibility within the wider 
corporation. In part this was achieved by mobilizing appropriate „vocabularies of motive‟ 
(Mills, 1963), i.e. rhetorical repertoires capable of legitimizing their proposed courses of 
action. An example of this is the way in which subsidiary managers justified resistance to 
diversity proposals on the grounds that these would hinder rather than advance the diversity 
agenda, and they were also careful to advance alternative proposals that would achieve the 
same objective. 
These findings cast further doubt on „competitive advantage‟ models of international 
transfer since they strongly suggest that the modification and „hybridization‟ of diversity 
policy take place routinely. Subsidiary managers attempted to negotiate the terms of the 
transfer in ways which eroded the original content and intentions of the policy (although they 
sometimes tried to produce functional equivalents to central policy appropriate to local 
conditions). To put it another way, competitive-advantage-based models of transfer such as 
that of Taylor et al. (1996) under-emphasize issues around the „context-generalizability‟ of 
policy – that is how far the policy may be transferred to other institutional contexts – and they 
systematically neglect the potential for „resistive hybridization‟, based on the power resources 
of subsidiary actors, when policies is transferred to foreign operations. Conversely, while 
neo-institutionalists such as Kostova (1999) do not neglect the question of hybridization, they 
neglect the play of power and interests that attend it. 
A further issue is how the range of diversity outcomes can be explained. More 
systematic generalization would require a large-scale survey approach. However, some 
tentative conclusions may be drawn from the case studies. Florkowski (1996) suggests that 
the nature of international diversity policy reflects a combination of product- and labour-
market pressures for diversity in the home and host business systems. This strategic 
contingency approach finds some support in our case-study data. Companies like ITco that 
were globally more integrated in their operations appeared more likely to have strong global 
diversity policies. Conversely, Eng Servs was highly multidomestic in operation  because the 
engineering contracting sector needed to respond to highly local factors (see Colling and 
Clark, 2002). Companies whose markets both domestically and internationally were more 
diverse, especially in terms of gender and ethnicity, also had greater objective motivation for 
introducing diversity policies, as Florkowski‟s model predicts.  
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However, the extent of international diversity policy in the case-study companies 
could not be entirely explained by such structural factors. Within-sector comparisons show 
significant differences. For example, in engineering, Engco1 and Engco2 were medium-sized 
MNCs with overlapping product ranges. Yet Engco1 had a minimalist international policy, 
while Engco2 had a strong and relatively standardized global diversity programme. The case 
studies appear to demonstrate considerable space, within structural constraints, for 
managerial „strategic choice‟. Engco2 had a diversity programme that was directly in keeping 
with the philosophy of the founding family, still active within the company. In the early 
1980s the founder had issued a frequently referred-to statement on diversity which spoke of 
the need to abandon cherished prejudices concerning sex, race, accent or academic 
qualifications. This in turn was in line with Engco2‟s distinctive employee relations strategy, 
based on independent, company-based unions, a strong internal labour market, and high 
workforce commitment. In short, structural constraints leave a considerable margin of 
manoeuvre within which managers can exert choices.  
A final question is why US MNCs have sought to internationalize the diversity 
agenda given its at best ambiguous contribution to international competitive advantage. A 
first possibility is that diversity is part of a wider management approach that is seen to have 
competitive advantage as a whole. Companies might, for example, construct „ideological‟ 
sources of international competitive advantage by leveraging an explicit corporate 
philosophy, as in Engco2 and, to a lesser degree, in CPGco. „Diversity‟ could then be seen as 
one element in a company-specific, internationally-focused corporate culture. In short, the 
transfer of a well-tried recipe might have competitive advantage as a mode of global 
operation, even if individual elements might not be advantageous.
2
 However, this does not 
deal with the serious questions raised by UK respondents in these and other companies about 
the value of the diversity agenda.  
An alternative explanation raises more profound questions over the competitive 
advantage approach. This is that companies may adopt international diversity policies even 
when this does not lead to competitive advantage. There are a number of elements to this. 
One line of argument derives from the systemic dominance effects arguments of Smith and 
Meiksins (1996). The dominance of the US business model in the world economy encourages 
a presumption by US MNCs that domestically-devised policies such as diversity management 
are superior. Such policies may have greater legitimacy, both domestically and abroad, 
because they are associated with a dominant business system. Moreover, dominance itself 
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gives rise to considerable power resources to facilitate transfer. For example, there may be a 
high density of MNCs from a dominant parent in a given host country, creating more 
favourable conditions for the transfer and implantation of home practices in the host. These 
considerations open the possibility for policies to be transferred despite the fact that they do 
not confer competitive advantage as e.g. Taylor et al. (1996) presume.  
A further element relates to what might be called the „technology‟ of knowledge 
transfer in US firms. One important aspect of US business dominance was the early 
emergence of „organizational capabilities‟ (Chandler, 1990; see also Baron et al., 1986) in the 
form of standardized control systems that allowed consistent management of operating units 
spread across dispersed geographical territories and product markets. Such systems 
subsequently provided the basis for the internationalization of American companies 
(Chandler, 1990). Once global management structures have been introduced they provide a 
mechanism for transmitting further policies globally. In CPGco, „you set up a global HR 
organization and it‟s got to do something to justify its global title. So, you know, we‟ve got 
this big [diversity] programme, why shouldn‟t it be rolled out in China or Brazil or 
whatever...?‟ (UK manager). In other words, policies are disseminated internationally 
because the organizational technology exists. With the routine presence in US MNCs of what 
might be terms „low inertia‟ transmission mechanisms, based on formalized, standardized 
transmission channels, the marginal costs of international policy propagation are likely to be 
low. Thus policies may be internationalized even when competitive advantage is absent.  
 
Conclusions 
Diversity is a useful issue through which to examine the question of how policy is transferred 
internationally within MNCs since the embeddedness of the diversity agenda within the 
domestic US environment can be traced in a relatively straightforward manner. It has been 
argued that international diversity initiatives in US MNCs have primarily been outgrowths of 
domestically driven policies. Their transfer abroad has made assumptions about context-
generalizability that are sometimes inappropriate. As a result, subsidiary managers use 
available power resources to shape the content and impact of policy. The implications are far-
reaching. Top-down, senior-management-driven rationalistic models of transfer are 
inadequate since they neglect the impact of conflicts of perception about „appropriateness‟ 
among actors at different organizational levels, and the resources they can deploy to pursue 
 25 
their interests. Equally, however, current institutional analysis has shortcomings since it fails 
to see institutionalization as a contested process cross-nationally. We have argued that by 
combining the insights of institutionalism with a power and interests perspective, and by 
locating power resources in the context of comparative-institutional analysis, a more nuanced 
understanding of the transfer process is possible.  
Further research could explore these issues by looking at a wider range of policy 
transfers. Is „diversity‟ a special case, or would the transfer of other HR policies exhibit 
similar features? It seems likely that other issues will provoke yet greater „resistive 
hybridization‟ than in the case of diversity. This is particularly true where transferred policies 
directly confront core interests of important interest groups in the subsidiary, including 
employees and unions as well as managers. For example, Ortiz (1998) found that unions in 
the UK subsidiary of a US MNC resisted the introduction of teamworking because it 
challenged their core organizational interest in the control of work organization. In general, 
national institutional frameworks appear to provide a multiplicity of potential resources with 
which local subsidiary actors can challenge the transfer of policies or shape their 
implementation in ways unforeseen by headquarters. Conversely, other policies may be more 
easily internalized and induce more compliant responses from the subsidiary. This may be the 
case with innovative payment systems, where the cognitive and regulatory frameworks may 
be more isomorphic between the UK and the US. 
A second area for further research is the influence of the host environment. The 
findings have been drawn from one host, which is institutionally close to the US in many 
respects. Given the importance of institutional constraints within a national business system 
as a power resource for local subsidiary actors, extending the research to further host 
countries is likely to provide greater insight into the dynamics of transfer in MNCs. In 
particular, exploration of more highly „regulated‟ business systems such as Germany, where 
the basis of economic coordination relies more on supra-market principles than in the British 
or American „liberal market‟ model (Hall and Soskice, 2003), would throw more light on the 






 „Isomorphism‟ refers to the extent to which organizations adopt the same practices as other organizations 
within their environment (Zucker, 1977). 
2
 We are indebted to an anonymous JIBS reviewer for this insight. 
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Table 1 – Case study firms   
Core case studies   
firm sector number of respondents 
  UK subsidiary HQ* 
Engco1 mechanical engineering 19 4 
Engco2 mechanical engineering 18 11 
Eng Servs civil engineering contracting 18 1 
CPGco chemical-based consumer and 
professional goods 
15 5 
ITco IT services 14 8 
Business Services management consulting 2 3 
Total  86 32 
 
* ‘HQ’ refers to interviewees based US corporate headquarters, at international business unit 
headquarters (e.g. product divisions), or regional headquarters (e.g. European region); of the 36 
respondents in this column, 22 were in US-based corporate or business unit HQs.  




Table 2 – Summary of diversity policy in selected case-study companies 
 CPGco Engco1 Engco2 Eng Servs ITco  Business Services 
diversity as a global 
corporate value 
yes – diversity linked 
to respect for 
individual 
aim to become a 
global leader in 
integrating diversity 
into the business 











no  yes – diversity and 
inclusion as integral 
to corporate culture 
yes – firm promotes 
inclusive culture, and 
harnessing talents of 
diverse people 




of domestic diversity 
concerns 
chief diversity officer 




questions on „valuing 
diversity‟ in periodic 
no strong 
internationalization 







in each business unit 
site-level „diversity 
no - virtually no 
internationalization 




of diversity policy 









officer to ensure 
diversity policy 
applies world-wide;  
global programmes 
focusing on women‟s 
career development 
and advancement, 









for local diversity 
initiatives 
international 










initiatives to fit 
locality – e.g. 
introduction of 






on women in global 
diversity policies; 




global targets for 











action plan and 
progress reporting 
mandatory globally 
for business units 
universal gender 
component to plans, 
but other components 
left to locality 
global monitoring of 
no yes 
no formal targets/–
quotas in Europe but 
unpublicized target 
„ranges‟ e.g. for 
women 
discreet tracking of 
key diversity groups 
at local/regional level 
– e.g. metrics on new 
hires, women in 
yes 
ethnic and gender 





global reporting on 
ethnicity and gender 
balance of senior 
promotion candidates 
 36 
senior managers are 
set diversity targets 





to diversity metrics 
diversity metrics 




diversity action plans 
targets for diverse 












diversity training  
diversity/harassment 
training compulsory 
but mainly devolved 





monitored by HQ 
no  global courses 
available for use, but 
no compulsory 






training in the UK 
 
